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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE RIGHT TO COPY
NONFUNCTIONAL PRODUCT FEATURES
In formulating rules governing a businessman's duplication of the
design or appearance of a competitor's product,' the judiciary must
reconcile several divergent interests. 2 The public interest in lower
prices and free competition demands that businessmen be free to copy
products and product configurations 3 that are unprotected by federal
patent and copyright laws. 4 Because a product's distinctive appearance
may assist consumers in identifying its manufacturer, however, the
public interest may be served by limiting product imitation.5 For
example, the unique, heart-shaped configuration of a medicine tablet
may indicate to a prospective purchaser that it is produced by a
particular company in which the customer places his trust for quality
1. As used in this Note, the term "product" does not include an item's "trade
dress" such as packaging. For example, simulation of the configuration of a clock
excludes the box in which the clock is marketed.
2. See generally Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888, 909-11 (1964).
3. One court has stated:
[I]mitation is the life blood of competition. It is the unimpeded availability of substantially equivalent units that permits the normal operation of supply and demand to yield the fair price society must pay for
a given commodity. Unless such duplication is permitted, competition
may be unduly curtailed with the possible resultant development of
undesirable monopolistic conditions.
American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 915 (1959) (citations omitted).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides: "The Congress shall have power ...
to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." The federal patent law is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970);
the Copyrights Act is codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-810 (Supp. 1977).
A "mechanical" patent may be awarded for the invention or discovery of "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). In contrast, a
design patent, which creates a legal monopoly for the configuration of a manufactured article, is awarded for the invention of "any new, original and ornamental design." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970). Similar to the qualifications for a
mechanical patent, a design patent will be granted only if the design advances
the prior art and includes inventive genius. Id.; General Time Instruments Corp.
v. United States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846
(1948); see 1 R.

CALLMANN, UNFAIR

COMPETITION,

§ 16.3 (3d ed. 1967).
5. See notes 35-36 infra & accompanying text.
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and integrity.0 If this feature could be copied by a competitor who
marketed a similar product, customers might be confused as to the
tablet's source.7 A product's appearance, such as the pleasing pink
color of an upset stomach preparation, 8 also may contribute to its
popularity. The copying of such a novel characteristic, therefore, may
be unethical, particularly if development or promotion of the product's
distinguishable trait required significant expenditures of time, effort,
or money.)
The tort of unfair competition traditionally has provided the framework within which to balance the competing interests in product
simulation. If the copier has attempted reasonably to distinguish his
product from that of a competitor, state courts of equity generally
have permitted the copying of unpatented "functional" product
features. The reproduction of "nonfunctional" product characteristics,
in contrast, usually has been subject to injunction.
In 1964, however, the United States Supreme Court curbed the
development of the law of unfair competition when it decided Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.10 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc." In sweeping language, the Court held that state courts
could not enjoin the copying of products or product features unprotected by valid federal patents or copyrights. 12 Many courts consequently abandoned the traditional rules of unfair competition and permitted the copying of product features that previously would have
been protected from simulation. Nevertheless, courts subsequently
have attempted to temper the doctrine of Sears and Compco, returning
to the rules that prevailed before the decisions in those two cases.
6. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 196-97
(9th Cir. 1953).
7. Id.; see text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
8. See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 427, 431-32
(N.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919
(1960) (plaintiff failed to show secondary meaning or functionality of tablet's
pink color).
9. [A]t first glance it might seem intolerable that one manufacturer
should be allowed to sponge on another by pirating the product of
years of invention and development without license or recompense and
reap the fruits sown by another. Morally and ethically such practices
strike a discordant note. It cuts against the grain of justice to permit
an intruder to profit not only by the efforts of another but at his
expense as well.
American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959) (citation omitted).
10. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
11. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
12. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. at 237-39.
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This Note will analyze the courts' reaction to the copying of unpatented features designed solely to indicate a product's origin. After
tracing the development of the law of product simulation before the
decisions in Sears and Compco, the Note will discuss the evolving
judicial response to those decisions, especially as it reflects the competing interests inherent in this area of the law, and will suggest a
means of resolving controversies involving these complex issues.
TRADITIONAL RECONCILIATION OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS: THE
LAW OF PRODUCT SIMULATION PRIOR TO SEARS AND COMPCO

Attempting to prevent the simulation of unpatented product features and configurations, manufacturers have invoked several doctrines embodied in the law of unfair competition. "Passing off" and
"misappropriation," for example, are tortious acts that may be prevented by injunctions against the copying of product features. To
recover for the tort of passing off, a plaintiff must document both that
relief is needed to avert customer confusion and that the feature being
duplicated possesses certain utilitarian aspects. In contrast, charges
of misappropriation have relied on traditional notions of equity to
achieve protection of innovators' property rights.
Passing Off
Recognized under the general concept of unfair competition, 1 3 a
claim of passing off is based on the principle that no one has the
right to sell his goods as those of another. 14 A blatant form of passing
off is the filling of an order with the product of one manufacturer
after a customer requests the merchandise of another.' 5 In this situation, the customer is deceived as to the source of his purchase, and the
manufacturer whose product specifically was requested not only loses
13. Little consensus exists as to the scope of the law of unfair competition.

The concepts of bribery, commercial disparagement, misappropriation, passing
off, and trademark infringement are perhaps the most commonly articulated
principles included within this subject. See, e.g., 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 4,
§ 15.1(c); Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 890-91 (1964). The
uncertain scope of unfair competition derives partially from its flexibility to
"exist in any endeavor to which human ingenuity lends itself." Pocket Books,
Inc. v. Meyers, 178 Misc. 59, 59, 33 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd per curiam,
265 App. Div. 17, 37 N.Y.S.2d 596

(1942).

See Pollack, Unfair Trading by

Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 74, 74-75 (1962).
14. Perhaps the earliest expression of this principle is found in Croft v. Day,
49 Eng. Rep. 994, 996 (Ch. 1843).
15. See 1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 4, § 4.1.
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a sale but also risks injury to his reputation if the substituted product
is of inferior quality.
Passing off also may result if a product is affixed with another's
trademark. Because a trademark, such as a label or distinctive packaging, indicates the origin of a product, its duplication by a competitor
could lead to customer confusion as to the merchandise's source. The
goods of a manufacturer who has copied his competitor's trademark
usually are passed off as the products of the trademark's original
owner.
Acknowledging that a product's distinctive features may serve
recognitional purposes, courts have applied many trademark law rules
to the tort of passing off to enjoin the copying of features that merely
indicate a product's origin. According to the majority rule, the copying of a non-functional feature that has acquired a secondary meaning
and whose use by a competitor would cause customer confusion as to
the product's source may be enjoined. 17 After a satisfaction of this
test's specifications, the similarity of the product features will create
an inference of intent to pass off. s
Functionality
A product usually includes two components: functional features
and arbitrary embellishments. A functional characteristic is one that
16. See 3 id. § 84.1(a).
17. See, e.g., Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir.
1917). Consonant with the majority rule, § 741 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
(1938) provides:
One who markets goods, the physical appearance of which is a copy
or imitation of the physical appearance of the goods of which another
is the initial distributor, markets them with an unprivileged imtation .

..

if his goods are of the same class as those of the other

and are sold in a market in which the other's interest is protected, and
(b) the copied or imitated feature has acquired generally
in the market a special significance identifying the other's
goods, and
(i) the copy or imitation is likely to cause
prospective purchasers to regard his goods as
those of the other, and
(ii) the copied or imitated feature is nonfunctional or, if it is functional, he does not
take reasonable steps to inform prospective
purchasers that the goods which he markets
are not those of the other.
Id.
18. See, e.g., Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 F. 240, 241
(2d Cir. 1904).
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affects the "purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy
of processing, handling or using" the product. 1' Obvious types of
functional features include those that either insure the product's
21
operation 20 or reduce its cost of manufacture.
Unlike nonfunctional features, which may not be copied and used
as part of a product if their association with a competitor's goods
is likely to create customer confusion, functional traits generally
may be duplicated freely. 22 This doctrine of functionality 23 evolved
as a means of preventing the infringement by the law of unfair com24
petition on the operation of the federal mechanical patent laws.
For example, if a particular product fails to qualify for a patent because it does not satisfy the relevant federal standards, 5 it should
be denied protection from unprivileged reproduction under the law of
unfair competition. To award such a monopoly would prevent the
copying of a product feature placed in the public domain by the federal
patent laws. 2 As a result, a court will permit a manufacturer to copy
those traits of a competitor's item that it finds to be functional.
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, at 628-29 (1938). See, e.g., West Point Mfg.
Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 591 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
840 (1955).
20. See, e.g., Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265 (N.D.Ill.),
aff'd per curiam, 245 F. 988 (7th Cir. 1917) (reflector, luminous bowl, and
lighting fixture essential to diffuse light from electric lamp); Marvel Co. v.
Pearl, 133 F. 160 (2d Cir. 1904) (compressible rubber bulb essential to whirling
spray discharge from syringe).
21. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (size, shape, and location of holes in cigarette lighter windscreen);
Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v. United States Expansion Bolt Co., 177 App. Div.
554, 164 N.Y.S. 433 (1917) (expansion bolts and anchors for use with lag
screws).
22. See, e.g., Bliss v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963).
23. For a detailed analysis of the doctrine of functionality see Note, Unfair
Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 544 (1964).
[hereinafter cited as Unfair Competition].
24. See, e.g., Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d
145, 151, 360 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1977). Of course, the functionality doctrine does
not preclude conflicts between the law of unfair competition and the federal
design patent laws: configurations protected by the latter are nonfunctional. Cf.
Hopkins v. Waco Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 221, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1953) (designs
dictated by functional requirements generally are unpatentable). Conflict between
these two areas of the law has been avoided under the assumption that their
operation protects different interests. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1970).
26. Functional features, which
are common property, may be made by any manufacturer of such an
article, and cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark. Where the
article itself is one which any one of common right may make, no
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Some courts have expanded the concept of functionality to include
any feature that is an "important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product," 27 while defining as nonfunctional those traits
"unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection with the product." 28 The Ninth Circuit recognized this doctrine of "aesthetic
functionality" 29 in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,3 0 in which the
plaintiff was permitted to copy the distinctive design of the defendant's hotel china. Because the product's economic success derived
largely from the esteem with which purchasers regarded the design,
the court found this feature to be functional. To enjoin the copying
of the design, the court stated, would render the defendant "immune
from the most direct and effective competition" in the sale of his product.31 Although the public interest benefits by permitting unpatented
product features to be copied, some courts nevertheless have rejected
32
the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.
Secondary Meaning
If a nonfunctional product feature acquires a secondary meaning,
its copying will be enjoined whenever customer confusion as to the
person by making that article . . . can convert that article itself into
a trade-mark and thereby acquire an exclusive right to make it in
perpetuity. To allow this would be to destroy the 17-year limitation
of the patent system.
Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1916). See also
Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918) (L.
Hand, J.), in which the court stated: "Under the guise of protecting against
unfair competition, we must be jealous not to create perpetual monopolies." Id.
at 964.
27. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); accord,
J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941).
28. 198 F.2d at 343.
29. See Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 564-65.
30. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
31. Id. at 344.
32. See, e.g., Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.
Cal. 1954). In Haeger Potteries the defendant manufactured and profitably sold
exact copies of the plaintiff's ashtrays, the commercial success of which was
attributable to the item's pleasing appearance. Rather than characterizing the
design as functional because of its popularity, the court held that it was nonfunctional and thus was protected from copying. The court reasoned that "[i]f
the aesthetic quality of the form were held to be functional, then every feature
of a product, even the ornamental and nonutilitarian, would be functional. It is
the utility to hold ashes, and not a precise shape or form, which is 'the natural
and characteristic action' of an ashtray." Id. at 271.
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source of the product would result.3 3 A feature acquires secondary
meaning if prospective customers associate it with a particular manufacturer or source, regardless of whether the customer knows the
name of the manufacturer or source.3 4 Providing an indicia of origin,
the product feature serves as a trademark, the copying of which would
allow one businessman to pass off his goods as those of another. Because a nonfunctional characteristic assists neither the performance
nor the manufacture of the product, but merely indicates the goods'
origin, the traditional law of unfair competition holds that no danger
to free competition arises from an injunction against the copying of
those features. 35
Similarly, functional product features may acquire secondary meanings. Unlike an injunction preventing the duplication of nonfunctional
characteristics, however, a similar prohibition against the copying of
functional features necessarily would affect the product's performance, ease of manufacture, or marketability. Therefore, if purchaser
confusion may occur from the imitation of functional features, the
copier must take only reasonable measures, such as labelling or otherwise marking his product in an indicative manner to distinguish it
6
from that of his competitor.3
33. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Adanta Novelties Corp., 223 F. Supp. 866
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (doll dressed in distinctive clothing); Republic Molding Corp.
v. B.W. Photo Utilities, 124 U.S.P.Q. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (plastic vegetable
bin design); Frawley Corp. v. Penmaster Co., 131 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ill. 1954)
(retractable ball point pen).
34. See, e.g., Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir.
1917) (L. Hand, J.), in which the court stated:
[I]t is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff
... show that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean
that some particular person-the plaintiff may not be individually
known-makes them, and that the public cares who does make them,
and not merely for their appearance and structure.
Id. at 300. This is the definitive explication of the rule. See, e.g., French Amer.
Reeds Mfg. Co. v. Park Plastics Co., 20 N.J. Super. 325, -,
90 A.2d 50, 54-55
(1952).
35. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
36. See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)
(labelling required to distinguish pharmaceutical preparations with identical
appearance and taste); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F.
112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (L. Hand, J.) (coloring required to distinguish nearly
identical spark plugs); RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 741(b) (ii) (1938).
Compliance with such a requirement will not be compelled, however, if it
involves an expenditure of money that would unreasonably burden the copier's
ability to compete. For example, in Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co.,
250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918), the shape and appearance of the plaintiff's breakfast
biscuit were found to be functional features that had acquired secondary meaning.
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Customer Confusion
Absent a competing public interest in the appearance of a product,
such as the prevention of customer confusion from the simulation of
a product feature with a secondary meaning, the copying of an unpatented or uncopyrighted product feature generally is permissible.3 7
Proving customer confusion under the traditional rules of unfair competition, however, does not require evidence of actual inaccurate
associations by purchasers. Rather, a showing that secondary meaning
exists and that customer confusion is likely to occur suffices.3 Although the concept of customer confusion usually pertains only to the
misapprehensions of prospective purchasers as to a product's source,
at least one court has extended the doctrine to include any person who
may be confused, even after the merchandise's sale.39
Misappropriation
In restricting the copying of product features to the extent necessary to avoid customer confusion, an injunction prohibiting passing
Judge Learned Hand ordered a six month probationary period to determine
whether the defendant could produce a biscuit with characteristics that, when
served without its wrappings, would indicate its source, but would not be so costly
as to hinder competition.
One court has held that a defendant who deliberately attempts to pass off his
goods as those of another may be required to alter the copied, although functional, features of his product. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d
255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959). This result has been described as
"perhaps unjustifiable." Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest:
Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 935,
970 n.158 (1962).
37. "In the absence of some recognized right at common law, or under the
statutes . . . a man's property is limited to the chattels which embody his invention. Others may imitate these at their pleasure." Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930). But see notes 40-53 infra & accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845, 847
(E.D. La. 1960).
39. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955). In
Mastercraftersthe defendant incorporated the distinctive design of the plaintiff's
nonelectric "Atmos" clock into an inexpensive electric copy. The defendant's
packaging and the extreme difference in price between the two clocks led the
court to find that purchasers probably could distinguish between the two products.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit granted an injunction against the copying of
the nonfunctional features of the plaintiff's clock because acquaintances of
persons who had purchased the defendant's clock could believe it was manufactured by the plaintiff, especially if the electrical cord had been hidden. Id. at
466.
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off primarily promotes the public interest. 411The doctrine against
misappropriation, in contrast, permits an injunction against the dupli4
cation of product traits to protect an innovator's property rights. 1
The Supreme Court articulated the latter doctrine in International
News Service v. Associated Press,42 in which the International News
Service (INS) sold, as its own, news reports from the Associated
Press's (AP) early editions. Although the INS did not pass off its
reports as those of AP, it had competed unfairly 43 by "endeavoring
to reap where it had not sown." 44 According to the Court, the admitted taking of salable material, gathered through the labor, skill,
and financing of the AP, was an act of appropriation that should be
characterized as "unfair competition in business." 45
InternationalNews's misappropriation doctrine met with little acceptance in subsequent product simulation cases. 4" A diversity case
based on the federal common law, InternationalNews lost its marginal
precedential value 47 after Erie Railroadv. Tompkins's 4s holding that
the substantive law of the states must be applied in federal courts. "
Moreover, some commentators have criticized the doctrine's application because an injunction against copying is based not on the public
interest but on a court's determination that the defendant's conduct
is unfair or unethical to his competitors."
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 36, at 936-41.
See 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 4, § 60.3.
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
The Court stated:
It is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking because
there is no attempt by defendant to palm off its goods as those of the
complainant, characteristic of the most familiar, if not the most
typical, cases of unfair competition. But we cannot concede that
the right to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases.
Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 239.
45. Id. at 239-40.
46. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
See 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 4, § 60.2.
47. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938)
(applying Erie to law of product simulation); Peterson, The Legislative Mandate
of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a FederalLaw of Unfair Competition, 69 DICK.
L. REv. 347, 355-56 (1965).
48. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49. Erie eliminated the concept of a federal common law by holding that the
federal courts were to apply the substantive law of the states in diversity cases
unless the matters in question were governed by the United States Constitution
or an act of Congress. Id. at 78.
50. See generally Stern & Hoffman, supra note 36.
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InternationalNews never has been overruled, however, and several
states have applied the misappropriation doctrine. For example, in the
1956 decision of Dior v. Milton,51 the defendant copied some of the
plaintiff's dress designs. The plaintiff had not yet marketed the
original dresses; the designs therefore could not have acquired a secondary meaning. Moreover, no evidence of passing off existed. Nevertheless, the New York Supreme Court based its rejection of the
defendant's motion to dismiss the suit on the misappropriation doctrine. 52 Because the doctrine is intended to protect the innovator's
property rights, a demonstration that the copied feature had acquired
53
a secondary meaning was unnecessary.
THE SEARS AND COMPCo DECISIONS

The Supreme Court's decisions in the companion cases of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.54 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.55 cast into doubt the validity of much of the law of unfair
competition. In Sears, the Stiffel Company had been granted design
and mechanical patents on a "pole lamp," a steel tube extending from
floor to ceiling with attached lighting fixtures. After Stiffel had
enjoyed a period of commercial success, Sears marketed an almost
identical but unlabelled copy of the plaintiff's pole lamp at a price
significantly lower than that of the originator. 57 Stiffel then brought
suit for patent infringement and unfair competition.
Addressing the charge of patent infringement, the district court
held that Stiffel's design and mechanical patents were invalid for
want of invention.58 As to the charge of unfair competition, however,
the court found not only that customer confusion between the two
products was likely, but that misapprehension already had occurred. 59
The district court consequently enjoined Sears from selling pole lamps
similar to those of the plaintiff's model.60
51. 9 Misc.2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mer., 2 App. Div. 2d 878,
156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
52. 9 Misc.2d at 431-35, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 452-55. The facts in Dior also supported a claim based 6n unjustifiable interference with the plaintiff's contractual
rights. Id. at 440, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
53. See Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d
488 (1953).
54. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
55. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
56. 376 U.S. at 226.
57. Sears' retail price for its pole lamps was approximately equivalent to
Stiffel's wholesale price. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision.," Although it questioned whether the district court had made
a finding of secondary meaning, the appellate court held that, under
the applicable Illinois law, 2° a showing that customers had associated
the product with the original manufacturer was not mandatory.
Rather, proof of unfair competition required only that a "likelihood
of confusion as to the source of the products" existed' 3 The Supreme
Court reversed. Reasoning that the plaintiff had gained monopoly
protection under the law of unfair competition only because no federal
patent protected its pole lamps, the Court cited the "familiar doctrine" that "a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration
date or give a patent on an article which lacked the levels of invention
required for federal patents." 64 If a state could not encroach directly
on the federal patent laws, the Court continued, it could not do so indirectly by invoking its law of unfair competition. 5
Sears also limited the relief available to manufacturers of unpatented products whose competitors market products with identical
features. Noting that the appellate court had affirmed the defendant's
liability solely because purchaser confusion was probable the Court
concluded that the public's mere inability to distinguish between
similar articles was insufficient to justify injunctive and monetary
relief. 66 Instead, to assist the customer in identifying products whose
features could be copied without offending the federal patent laws,
the state could require labelling or other similar protective measures.
Regardless of the existence of lesser state-provided protections, however, if a product was unpatented or uncopyrighted, a state could not
discourage its duplication by providing either injunctive or monetary
relief.61
In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,"" plaintiff Day-Brite
brought an action for design patent infringement and unfair competition based on the defendant's copying of Day-Brite's fluorescent
lighting fixtures and distinctive reflector ribbing. As in Sears, the
district court held invalid the plaintiff's patents on the lighting fixtures but found the defendant guilty of unfair competition under
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 118. See note 75 infra.
313 F.2d at 118 n.7.
376 U.S. at 231 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232-33.
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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Illinois law. By copying the Day-Brite fixture ribbing, a functional
feature that had acquired a secondary meaning, Compco had created
potential or actual customer confusion! 9 Accordingly, the court
ordered injunctive and monetary relief. 70 Citing the likelihood of
confusion and the principles of "old fashioned honesty," the Seventh
71
Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court again reversed. The majority opinion stated
that, even if the finding of secondary meaning were accepted, an injunction against the copying of an unpatented article would conflict
with the federal patent laws. 72 Because unpatented product features
remain in the public domain and therefore are available for duplication, states could require only that copiers identify their products.
Whether a design is nonfunctional or essential, has acquired a secondary meaning, or causes confusion among customers, were questions relevant only to the determination of violations of state mandated precautionary measures. 73 Justice Harlan's concurrence, however, indicated that he would subject copying to state restrictions if a
court found, other than by inference, that the duplication had been
undertaken with the deliberate intent and the effect of palming off
74
one's goods as those of another.
The Broad Sweep of Sears and Compco
The Supreme Court could have reversed the decisions of the lower
court in Sears and Compco on grounds narrower than its broad preemption approach. In both its doctrinal basis and its application of
state law, the Seventh Circuit had erred in affirming the injunctions
against copying. As authority for granting an injunction against
product copying solely on a showing of likelihood of confusion, the
court cited a trade name infringement case rather than a product
simulation dispute. 75 In Sears and Compco, moreover, the enjoined
69. See id. at 235.
70. See id. at 235-36.
71. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
"The capacity of the plaintiff's design to serve the plaintiff in somewhat the
manner of a trademark does constitute a 'protectable right'." Id. at 30.
72. 376 U.S. at 237.
73. Id. at 238.
74. 376 U.S. at 239 (Harlan, J., concurring).
75. In both Sears and Compco, the Seventh Circuit cited Independent Nail &
Packaging Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953), for the proposition that unfair competition under
Illinois law could be found simply on a showing that customer confusion probably
would result from the copying of a competitor's product. 313 F.2d at 30; 311 F.2d
at 118. Because Independent Nail involved the use of trade names, the Supreme
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product features were functional 70 thus falling within a classification
traditionally unprotected from copying under state laws of unfair
competition.77 Finally, the district court in Sears had made no finding
as to whether any part of the plaintiff's pole lamps, functional or
nonfunctional, had acquired a secondary meaning.78 If prospective
purchasers do not associate a feature with its manufacturer, then a
finding that customer confusion will result from the copying is improbable. 9 Clearly, the Court's sweeping holding need not have encompassed nonfunctional features useful only as indicia of origin. 0
THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER SEARS AND COMPCO

Sears and Compco produced two significant changes in the state law
of unfair competition. These cases reduced the permissible scope of
the remedies for unfair competition that previously had been available and increased the plaintiff's burden of proof to warrant such
relief.
Based on the principle that state law may not prohibit the copying
of articles unprotected by a patent or copyright, the Court limited
the potential state relief that could be granted for the marketing of
products containing features copied from another's goods to actions
in which the plaintiff proves the violation of a state labelling requirement or other precautionary measure enacted to prevent public deception.8 ' Although damages could be awarded for a failure to comply
Court questioned its precedential value as to the Illinois law of product simulation. See 376 U.S. at 228 n.2; 376 U.S. at 236 n.3.
76. In Compco, the district court found specifically that in strengthening the
product, the distinctive ribbing in the plaintiff's lighting fixture was functional.
See 311 F.2d at 28. Although no express finding was made in Sears, the lamp's
design appears to have been functional in that it served to mount the lighting
fixture from the ceiling to the floor. See 376 U.S. at 226.
77. See notes 19-26 supra & accompanying text.
78. See 376 U.S. at 226-27.
79. See notes 33-36 supra & accompanying text.
80. See Derenberg, ProductSimulation: A Right or Wrong?, 64 CoLuM. L. REV.
1192, 1204 (1964). Soon after the decisions in Sears and Compco, five commentators in a symposium reached different conclusions as to the meaning of the
Court's holdings. See Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1178 (1964).
81. 376 U.S. at 238. The Court apparently assumed that customer confusion as
to the source of products that otherwise are identical can be alleviated by a
labelling requirement. This supposition may be erroneous because purchasers
often identify an item by its unique configuration rather than by the manufacturer's name. See Derenberg, supra note 80, at 1206. But see Treece, Copying
Methods of Product Differentiation: Fair or Unfair Competition?, 38 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 244 (1963). "The literacy rate is high enough in the United States
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with such measures,8 2 the Court's broad language indicated that the
act of copying alone could not provide a basis for recovery.8 To authorize further state interference, the Court reasoned, would conflict
with the federal policy of "allowing free access to whatever the federal
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain." 84
Despite their extensive restrictions on potential state remedies, the
decisions in Sears and Compco did not foreclose injunctive relief
against all forms of unfair competition. Rather, they prevented only
prohibitions against the copying of unpatented or uncopyrighted
products features. Thus, an injunction could issue to prevent further
filling of orders with one manufacturer's products after purchasers
had requested the goods of another. n
Aside from its recognition that this blatant form of passing off
could be enjoined, however, the Court implicitly disapproved injunctions against passing off based entirely on evidence that a product
had acquired a secondary meaning. In Sears the Court criticized the
appellate court's affirmance of a finding of unfair competition based
solely on evidence that the two pole lamps were sufficiently similar in
appearance to present a likelihood of confusion.8 That a likelihood of
confusion alone can support neither an injunction against copying nor
an award of damages suggests that states must require more evidence
of unfair competition than a showing that a nonfunctional product
feature has acquired secondary meaning: actual instances of confusion apparently must be demonstrated.
The principal advanced in Sears and Compco, allowing the public to
copy products and product features unprotected by the patent and
copyright laws, may have overruled International News Service v.
Associated Press.-7 Although the former opinions did not cite InterternationalNews, the application of the misappropriation doctrine to
permit liability for the copying of unpatented or uncopyrighted
goods Isis inconsistent with the policy advanced in Sears and Compco
of insuring free access to such products.
...to justify the courts in requiring consumers who care about source to read
names on labels." Id. at 261.
82. 376 U.S. at 238.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally Id.

86. Id.
87. For a discussion concluding that Sears and Compco overruled International
News see Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318-19
(1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1968).
88. See notes 40-53 supra & accompanying text.
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The rationale adopted by the Court in Sears and Compco suggests
that the mere existence of the federal patent and copyright laws
precludes liability for the copying of product features unprotected by
those laws. Such an assertion, however, contravenes the commonly
recognized independence of the law of trademark and unfair competition from that of patent and copyright. The two legal areas foster
disparate interests: the law of unfair competition's prohibition
against the copying of nonfunctional product features used as trademarks serves the public interest by preventing customer confusion, 9
but the patent and copyright laws offer a reward for individual inventive genius.90 Sears and Compco, therefore, appear to have altered
much of the traditional approach to the law of product simulation.
JUDICIAL REACTION TO SEARS AND COMPCO

Early Decisions: A Strict Application of Sears and Compco
In the decade following the Supreme Court's decision in Sears and
Compco, lower courts generally interpreted those opinions as severely
89. See notes 13-18 supra & accompanying text.
90. Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by Patent, Trademark,
Copyright and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product
Simulation Law, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 413, 432 (1964). The trademark protection
afforded product designs under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970),
also may conflict with the patent and copyright laws. The distinctive configurations of bottles, as opposed to the product contained therein, frequently have been
the subject of Lanham Act registration, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1091 (1970). See, e.g.,
In re Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959); Ex parte Haig & Haig
Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r of Patents, 1958). In In re Minnesota Mining
and Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964), the court permitted registration of
a product configuration but did not comment on whether the protection afforded
federally registered trademarks would conflict with the federal design patent
law. In In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), the court
remanded the case to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to determine
whether a bottle configuration covered by a design patent could be registered as
a trademark on a showing of secondary meaning. Id. at 932. Finding that no
secondary meaning had attached to the form of the bottles, the Board refused
to permit registration. Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
affirmed the Board's decision, a concurring opinion queried whether the patent
and trademark laws were in conflict. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d
539, 542 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., concurring). Judge Smith discerned no
conflict, however, because the design patent law and the federal trademark law
protect different interests:
The purpose of federal design patent laws is to encourage the creation
of ornamental designs. The inventor receives, for a limited time, a
federal right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
patented design throughout the United States.... Federal trademark
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limiting the law of unfair competition." For example, in Tappan
Co. v. General Motors Corp.,92 decided by a federal district court in
1965, the plaintiff alleged unfair competition on the ground that the
defendant had copied the former's electric ranges, including those nonfunctional features that had acquired a secondary meaning. Granting

the defendant's motion for summary judgment,93 the court held that,
assuming reproduction had occurred, under Sears and Compco the defendant could be required only to label its electric ranges. Because the
defendant's product already displayed its name and trademark, it

was not answerable to the plaintiff,9 4 absent other evidence of passing
off.
The court in Tappan assumed, as did the Supreme Court in Sears
and Compco, that a labelling requirement could prevent customer confusion when a competitor copies product features serving as trademarks. Because purchasers tend to recognize products not by the name
of the manufacturer but by their distinctive appearance, however,
the validity of this assumption is questionable.", Particularly after
manufacturers have advertised their goods extensively on television
and in magazines, identification from the product's appearance is
probable. This situation occurred in Remco Industries, Inc. v. Toyomenka, Inc.,!" decided by a New York district court in 1968, in which
the plaintiff had promoted its new toy jeep through an extensive television advertising campaign directed at children. After the jeep had
become commercially successful, the defendant marketed a similar toy.
laws, independent in origin from design patent law, have the dual
purpose of protecting both the trademark owner and the public from
confusion, deception and mistake.
Id. at 543. See also 328 F.2d 925, 929-30, in which the court stated: "The underlying purpose and the essence of patent rights are separate and distinct from
those appertaining to trademarks. No right accruing from the one is dependent
upon or conditioned by any right concomitant to the other."
91. See Comment, Unfair Competition and Product Simulation: Reactions to
Sears and Compco, 18 S.D.L. REv. 480, 490-93 (1973).
92. 245 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd, 380 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1967).
93. A second count alleged infringement of the plaintiff's patents. 245 F. Supp.
at 973.
94. Id. at 977-78. See Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1972). In Bose the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant competed
unfairly in copying the distinctive shape of the plaintiff's high fidelity loud
speaker. Although conceding that the nonfunctional features of the plaintiff's
design had acquired a secondary meaning, the court held that the defendant's
label militated against a finding of passing off. Id. at 309-10. Accord, Laura
Secord Candy Shop Ltd. v. Barton's Candy Corp., 368 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (candy); Bercy Indus., Inc. v. Mechanical Mirror Works, Inc., 274 F.
Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (portable illuminated mirror).
95. See note 81 supra.
96. 286 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Rejecting the claim that the distinctive, nonfunctional features of the
jeep enabled "small children to readily recognize the little vehicle as
the one advertised on T.V.," 97 the court held that the plaintiff had
failed to establish that the nonfunctional features of his product had
acquired a secondary meaning.98 Even if secondary meaning were
established, the court continued, under Sears and Compco the copying
of plaintiff's jeep by defendant could require only that the latter label
his product. 9
The district court's purported application of Sears and Compeo
to prohibit an injunction in the latter instance, however, would have
produced an unsatisfactory result. A labelling requirement might be
of little aid in protecting against customer confusion if the product in
dispute is purchased primarily by or for youngsters. Children probably will identify and choose an item, not by a label they often cannot
read, but by product features they recognize through exposure to
media such as television advertisements. Confusion of product identity could arise among consumers of all ages, as a consequence of the
use of marketing methods such as mass media and mail-order solicitations that guarantee no explicit disclosure of product labels. Only
an injunction can prevent purchaser misapprehension in a situation
when the product's source is identified solely by the distinctiveness
of its features.
Although injunctions have been issued in other product simulation
cases following Sears and Compco, the decisions in Tappan, Remco,
and several other cases 10 illustrate that liability for passing off now
97. 286 F. Supp. at 952.
98. Id. at 953. Prior to the decisions in Sears and Compco, the copying of
nonfunctional features of children's toys, if such characteristics had acquired a
secondary meaning, often was enjoined. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Adanta
Novelties Corp., 223 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (sale of similarly dressed
dolls enjoined to prevent customer confusion). The possibility that prospective
customers will be children may be an important factor in determining the likelihood of purchaser confusion. Id. at 869.
99. The court stated:
Compco also makes it clear that the inability of consumers to tell two
products apart does not provide a basis for the [injunctive] relief
sought by plaintiff. Rather the focus is upon whether the facts, if
shown, of confusion, secondary meaning and the like make applicable a state's law requiring such precautions as labelling.
286 F. Supp. at 966. A similar conclusion was reached in Kingsway, Inc. v.
Werner, 233 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Mo. 1964), in which the plaintiff and defendant
manufactured the same style of plastic chess set.
100. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 310 (2d
Cir. 1972) ; Kingsway, Inc. v. Werner, 233 F. Supp. 102, 104 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
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requires much stronger evidence than the mere act of copying.'1 1 Despite the difficult burden of demonstrating positively that the copier
is attempting to sell his own goods as those of another, some plaintiffs have been successful in extreme cases. In B. H. Bunn Co. v. AAA
Replacement Parts Co., 0 2 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1971, the
defendant, a former salesman for the plaintiff, made copies of the
unpatented portions of the plaintiff's automatic tying machine. In
marketing the copies as replacement parts for the plaintiff's machines, the defendant used the plaintiff's order number system, parts
descriptions, and pricing scale. The court deemed this combination of
1 3
factors sufficient to affirm a finding of passing off.
Similarly, in Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 04 a 1967
decision, the defendant made exact copies of the plaintiff's "DrinkLite" novelty. When his copies malfunctioned, the defendant used the
plaintiff's product as a model in trade shows to obtain orders for his
imitation. In addition, the defendant copied much of the plaintiff's
packaging plan. Again, the totality of these factors sufficiently
evidenced an intent to pass off.' 0 5
A strict application of Sears and Compco in cases of product simulation requires that an injunction against unfair competition be sufficiently narrow to permit the copying of unpatented or uncopyrighted
features. In Bunn, therefore, the defendant was enjoined from using
the plaintiff's order number system, parts descriptions, and pricing
scale, but he remained free to make copies of the unpatented portions
of the plaintiff's machine. 0 6 Similarly, in Crossbow, the court issued
an injunction prohibiting the filling of orders gained through use of
the plaintiff's novelty as a trade show sample, but allowing the actual
manufacture of copies of the item. 0 7 Conversely, when the trial
court in Riback Enterprises, Inc. v. Denham 108 issued a blanket in101. See, e.g., Remco Indus., Inc. v. Toyomenka, 286 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1968), in which the court stated:
When Compco and Sears are applied to the facts of this case, it is

quite clear that the plaintiff has attempted to attach greater consequences to defendants' alleged copying than the law permits.

The inference of intent to deceive that plaintiff seeks to draw from
copying is not a permissible one and plaintiff's theory that palming

off may be inferred from mere copying is erroneous.
Id. at 955.
102. 451 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1971).

103. Id. at 1263-64.
104. 266 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

105. Id. at 339.
106. 451 F.2d at 1269.
107. 266 F. Supp. at 341.
108. 452 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1971).
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junction restraining the defendant from selling format copies of the
plaintiff's greeting cards, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit involked Sears and Compco to set aside the injunction. 09
Later Cases: A Narrowing of Sears and Compco
Recent cases in the law of product simulation reveal significant
judicial dissatisfaction with the rationale of Sears and Compco. Interpreting these Supreme Court decisions narrowly, several courts have
granted relief in a manner consistent with the law of unfair competition as it had developed prior to 1964. Moreover, some decisions
indicate a renewed interest in the doctrine of misappropriation.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Truck
Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf,110 in which the defendant copied
the exterior design of the plaintiff's grain semi-trailer. The plaintiff
brought an action under section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act " for injunctive and monetary relief, but the district court only awarded the
plaintiff damages, thus permitting the defendant to continue using
the design. 1 12 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found moot the need for
equitable relief 13 but affirmed as to the defendant's liability for
4
copying the plaintiff's design."1
The appellate court's decision rested both on the traditional protection against passing off ond on the doctrine of misappropriation.
Affirming the district court's findings that the plaintiff's design for
109. Id. at 848-49.
110. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 661 (1976).
111. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1970), provides in
pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods .

.

. a false designation of origin ....

in-

cluding words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter
into commerce, . . . shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin
or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.

If a plaintiff cannot obtain relief for trademark infringement under § 32
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970), because he has not registered his
trademark, see note 90 supra, he nevertheless may seek relief under § 43(a).
See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).

112. 536 F.2d at 1213.
113. Id. at 1213-14 n.1.
114. Id. at 1222-23.
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its semi-trailers was nonfunctional and had acquired a secondary
meaning, the court also agreed that the defendant's copying actually
had caused customer confusion.11 5 The court noted the ample evidence
of customer confusion in the record in rejecting the defendant's contention that the design could not have acquired a secondary meaning."0 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit stated, even if secondary meaning were not proved, liability for copying could be based on the de7
fendant's misappropriation of the plaintiff's design."
The court perceived no conflict between the law of trademark,
under which the plaintiff's design was protected, and the federal
patent laws, in that "each is directed at a different purpose." 118 Nor
did the decisions in Sears and Compco demand a different result
in Truck Equipment. Because the issue in the former cases was
whether states could "extend the effective term of patent protection
granted by the federal statutes," the appellate court correctly concluded that the Supreme Court's discussion of the questions of functionality and secondary meaning was dictim.'
Consequently, the
Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the rationale of Sear-s and Compco
that the existence of the federal patent laws prohibits liability for the
20
copying of unpatented product features.1
The view that state law may authorize injunctions against the
reproduction of unpatented product features that become common law
21trademarks was expressed in Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Quonaar. 1
Determining that the defendant copied the distinctive appearance of
the plaintiff's parking meters,'1 22 a New Jersey district court found
that the design was nonfunctional, had acquired a secondary meaning, and, when used by the defendant, had led to customer confusion. 1 23 Together, these facts constituted common law trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act ' 2 4 and also evidenced passing
off under state law. The court adopted the Eighth Circuit's rationale
115. Id. at 1217-21.
116. Id. at 1220.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1215. See notes 89-90 supra & accompanying text.
119. Id. at 1214. See also notes 75-80 supra & accompanying text.
120. 536 F.2d at 1215.
121. 422 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976).
122. The top portion of the plaintiff's parking meters was shaped like an
"ice cream cone." Id. at 908.
123. Id. at 913-14. The court noted evidence of actual customer confusion. For
example, purchasers had complained to the plaintiff about the defendant's meters,
erroneously believing them to be maufactured by the plaintiff, and customers had
inquired whether the plaintiff had sold his business to the defendant. Id. at 914.
124. See note 111 supra.
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in Truck Equipment 125 that the law of trademark protected interests
different from those under the patent laws, and held that Sears and
Compco did not prevent federal protection of product features that
had become trademarks. 126 Moreover, in an extension of Truck Equipment, the district court stated that it did not "read Sears and Compco
to bar the application of New Jersey law of unfair competition in
trademark cases." 127 Because the defendant had breached federal and
state law, he was enjoined permanently from duplicating the plain128
tiff's design.
A Florida federal district court reached a similar conclusion in
Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Windmere Products, Inc. 1 29 Based on the
plaintiff's claim of patent infringement, the defendant was preliminarily enjoined from importing and marketing a showerhead spray
nozzle similar to the plaintiff's patented "Water Pik Shower Massage." 130 Addressing the plaintiff's second contention that the defendant was competing unfairly, the court held that Sears and
Compco did not prevent the state's law of unfair competition from
enjoining the copying of nonfunctional product features "which serve
only to indicate origin or to identify the product." 131 Because such
replication evinced the defendant's intent to pass off his product as
that of the plaintiff, 132 the court granted a preliminary injunction
against further copying of the nonfunctional shape, color, and letter13
ing style of the plaintiff's product. 3
The recent erosion of the rationale of Sears and Compco illustrates
judicial dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Supreme Court
34
reconciled the competing interests in the law of product simulation.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See text accompanying notes 110-120 supra.
422 F. Supp. at 910.
Id. at 915.
Id.
433 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
Id. at 741.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 741.
The Supreme Court itself has been reluctant to extend a broad view of

federal preemption to other areas of business regulation. In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the Court held that neither the constitutional copy-

right clause nor the federal copyright act had preempted the state's prerogative
to punish those engaging in "record piracy" or "tape piracy," although such

conduct was not prohibited by the federal copyright act. Id. at 560, 570. In
their dissents, four Justices viewed the Court's opinion as contrary to the
rationale of Sears and Compco that unpatented and uncopyrighted articles may
be copied freely by the public. 412 U.S. at 574 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 412 U.S.
at 578-79 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). In Kewanee Oil Co.
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Although the public has an interest in the promotion of free competition resulting from unhindered access to product features unprotected by patents or copyrights, it has a competing interest in
being apprised of a product's source. Ensuring source identity, moreover, coincides with a third public policy of safeguarding the interests
of a manufacturer who has become associated with his product's distinctive features. Protection of this association not only promotes the
marketing of high quality goods but also facilitates consumer distinction of similar items and prevents the diffusion of the original
manufacturer's goodwill and reputation among competitors who copy
the distinctive, nonfunctional features of his product.13 5
That the misappropriation doctrine may have renewed vitality in
product simulation cases as an alternative to liability for passing
off has been suggested not only by Truck Equipment but also by the
1977 decision in Merrell-NationalLaboratories,Inc. v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc.136 Alleging that the defendant manufacturer produced an
unpatented drug in tablet form with color and configuration identical
to those of the plaintiff's drug, the latter proved that the defendant
retailers had filled orders for its drug with the defendant manufacturer's product. 13 7 The New Jersey Federal District Court invoked the
state law of unfair competition to enjoin this blatant form of passing
off. 3 8 Although the court found neither that the nonfunctional features of the plaintiff's drug had acquired a secondary meaning nor
that their duplication would result in customer confusion, it also
invoked the state law of unfair competition to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant manufacturer from selling a
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Court held that the operation of the
federal patent laws does not prevent the states from protecting trade secrets.
Id. at 478-79. Once again, Justice Douglas's dissent described the Court's decision,
which permitted the copying of articles unprotected by the federal patent law,
as contradictory to the philosophy of Sears and Compco. 416 U.S. at 495.
135. Cf. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf, 536 F.2d at 1215 (quoting S. Rep.
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1275 (1946)), in which the court stated:
Trademarks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they
make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trademarks encourage
the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit
of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect trademarks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair
competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion
from those who have created them to those who have not.
136. 194 U.S.P.Q. 157 (D.N.J. 1977).
137. Id. at 158.
138. Id. at 161. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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product containing a shape and color similar to those of the plaintiff's
tablets.' 39
The opinion in Merrell-NationalLaboratories did not mention expressly the theory of misappropriation; nevertheless, the result is
explicable only by reference to that doctrine. By enjoining further
retailer substitution, the court could have prevented further lost sales
of the plaintiff's tablet resulting from that passing off while simultaneously ensuring that patients received the medicine they requested; it need not have proscribed the defendant's manufacturing
of the tablets. Moreover, in protecting the plaintiff's property rights
in its goodwill and reputation, the court's language suggests a reliance
on the doctrine of misappropriation:
[W]hile the promotion of competition in products in the
public domain is favored, the competitive advantage obtained by the earlier entrant into the field in terms of the
goodwill associated with his name is entitled to protection.
For though the goodwill of an unpatented product or device
is in the public domain ....
the goodwill, name and reputation of the producer remain his private property and
may
140
not be traded upon or exploited by his competitors.
RECONCILIATION OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS:

A

PROPOSAL

As the decisions in Sears and Compco demonstrate, many judicial
opinions fail to recognize the interests involved in the law of product
simulation.'41 The Seventh Circuit in Sears and Compco had permitted injunctive relief against copying based solely on the visual
similarity between competing products. The court of appeals' position,
which entirely failed to consider the public interest in free access to
product characteristics, however, was no less extreme than the
Supreme Court's conclusion that product simulation should never
be enjoined, even when the copied feature served only to identify the
product's origin. Clearly, a balancing of competing interests is necessary.
Courts can achieve this balance through a broad construction of
the doctrine of functionality, coupled with a strict requirement that
the elements of secondary meaning and customer confusion be proved
before an injunction is granted in a suit involving the passing off
offense. The rule that functional product characteristics may be
copied freely insures that competitors will have access to unpatented
139. Id.
140. Id. at 160 (quoting Pezon et Michel v. Earnest R. Hewin Assocs., Inc., 270
F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
141. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 36, at 941-44.
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features relating to a product's operation or economy of manufacture.
To this traditional concept of functionality, courts should append the
expanded principle of aesthetic functionality to provide competitors
with the license to copy all unpatented product features that the pub142
lic deems pleasing.
The interest in free competition requiring access to a product's
functional features, however, does not mandate placing in the public
domain those nonfunctional traits that have acquired a secondary
meaning and whose copying likely would create customer confusion.
Rather, a product's arbitrary embellishments should be protected
from duplication when these two elements have been proven. A return
to these traditional principles of fair competition will not only deter
purchaser deception but also will encourage manufacturers to market
high quality goods, by assuring that their reputation, to the extent
it is associated with a product's ornamentations, will be protected.
The interest in protecting nonfunctional product characteristics from
duplication to prevent customer misapprehension necessarily requires
proof that the feature has acquired a secondary meaning and that its
copying will create customer confusion; otherwise, a competitor's
imitation of a particular feature probably will not lead to the public's
misidentification of a product's source. Because the doctrine if misappropriation enjoins copying for purposes other than the protection
of the public from confusion, its application in the law of product
simulation consequently should be discouraged.
Protection against the passing off offense requires that the remedy
of an injunction against an imitator be available as an alternative
to a simple labelling order. The duplication of features with a secondary meaning is tolerable if a labelling requirement could prevent
customer confusion. When a labelling requirement is insufficient to
prevent the public's misidentification of a product's source, however,
injunctive relief against copying should be available. 143 Only if the
142. See notes 27-32 supra & accompanying text. Competitors must be permitted to copy features that the public finds aesthetically pleasing to prevent
the originator from exercising a perpetual monopoly over a characteristic that is
an important reason for the commercial success of a product. The court's refusal
in Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1954),
to apply the doctrine of aesthetic functionality resulted in an injunction against
the copying of an unpatented product feature demanded by the public. See note
32 supra.
143. See note 81 supra. For example, in Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
868 (1975), the defendant was enjoined from copying on its cloth patches the
plaintiff's hockey team emblems. The lower court had ordered the defendant only
to place on its packaging a label stating that the emblems neither were authorized
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courts may exercise their traditional powers of equity in product
simulation cases can they reconcile the competing interests optimally.
CONCLUSION

The law of product simulation has been unsettled since the Supreme
Court's decisions in Sears and Compeo. In their attempts to clarify
the law in this area, courts are required to balance competing public
interests in preserving unrestrained competition through the main-tenance of the general right to copy unpatented or uncopyrighted
product features while protecting against customer confusion as to a
product's origin. These interests might be harmonized best through
the continuance of the recent judicial propensity to construe the
Court's decisions in Sears and Compco narrowly. To augment this
narrow interpretation, the judiciary should effectuate the states' law
of unfair competition and thereby provide a meaningful deterrent to
the passing off offense. The implementation of state law, however,
must be restricted to the purpose of preventing customer misapprehension. Consequently, the courts should foster competition through
the adoption of an expanded definition of functionality and should
provide relief against passing off, equitable or otherwise, only when
the traditional elements of that offense can be proved.
by nor had emanated from the plaintiffs. Id. at 1008. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
however, because the labelling requirement was insufficient to prevent unfair

competition:
The exact duplication of the symbol and the sale as the team's
emblem satisfying the confusion requirement of the law, words

that indicate it was not authorized by the trademark owner are
insufficient to remedy the illegal confusion. Only a prohibition of the
unauthorized use will sufficiently remedy the wrong.

Id. at 1013.

